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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellant Ana Herreman-Garcia is appealing from convictions for grand theft
and forgery following a jury trial. R 170-174, 180-184. Relief should be granted for
these reasons: 1) structural error occurred when the State denied Ms. HerremanGarcia her state and federal constitutional rights to due process by failing to provide
her notice of the charge she would be facing sufficient so that she could prepare a
defense; 2) constitutional error occurred when the Court failed to give specific
unanimity instructions; and 3) evidentiary errors occurred, which the State cannot
prove harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. Procedural History
On April 11, 2014, the State filed a complaint alleging that Ms. HerremanGarcia committed felony grand theft in violation of LC. § 18-2403(1), 2407(1)(b),
2409 as follows:
That the Defendant, ANA GISELLE HERREMAN GARCIA, on or
between the 9th day of March, 2009 and the 3i5t day of October, 2011,
in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did wrongfully take cash of a
value in excess of One Thousand Dollars ($1000.00) lawful money of
the United States from the owner, A&A Landscape, with the intent to
appropriate to herself certain property of another.
R 7-8.
On the day of the preliminary hearing, the State amended the complaint to
add a count of forgery, felony, LC. § 18-3601, and a count of criminal possession of a
financial transaction card, felony, LC. § 18-3125, 3128. With regard to the forgery,
1

State alleged:
That the Defendant, ANA GISELLE HERREMAN GARCIA, on or
between the 8th day of August, 2010 and the 3rd day of November, 2010,
in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did, falsely and with the intent to
defraud another, forge a certain written instrument, to wit: check
#5008 on the account of Mukesh Mittal and Manisha Mittal payable to
A&A Landscape LLC in the amount of $652.01, and/or check #581 on
the account of Terra Nativa Homeowners Association payable to A&A
Landscape in the amount of $1375.00 by adding Ana Garcia to the 'Pay
to the Order of' section of the check.
R 47-48.
At the preliminary hearing, the State offered testimony that Ms. HerremanGarcia used an ATM card from A&A to make unauthorized purchases and cash
withdrawals. Prelim. T. p. 8, ln. 5-p. 17, ln. 1. The State also offered testimony
regarding the Mittal and Terra Nativa Homeowners Association (HOA) checks.
Prelim. T. p. 17, ln. 11-p. 25, ln. 25.
At the close of the hearing, the Court dismissed Count III and bound over on
Counts I (grand theft) and II (forgery). Prelim. T. p. 86, ln. 8-p. 89, ln. 9. The Court
stated that its understanding was that Count I, grand theft, related to the alleged
use of the ATM card including cash withdrawals and unauthorized purchases as
well as the Mittal and HOA checks and that Count II referred simply to alleged
forgeries on the two checks. Prelim. T. p. 89, ln. 10-p. 90, ln. 8. And, the State
confirmed this. Prelim. T. p. 90, ln. 10-11. In response, defense counsel stated,
"Okay. I wanted to make sure of that. Thank you, Your Honor." Prelim. T. p. 90,
ln. 12-13.
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The State filed the information using the same language as the amended
complaint. R 52-53.
The case went to trial. R 100-113.
At trial, the State presented evidence, over objection, of not only cash
transactions, but also of a variety of other alleged thefts, including theft of goods
and services using the ATM card, falsification of payroll records, receipt of double
pay and receipt of other checks.
Ms. Herreman-Garcia was convicted. R 134-35.
The Court denied Ms. Herreman-Garcia's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and in the alternative for a new trial, Tr. p. 709, ln. 823, and sentenced her to concurrent terms of six months fixed followed by an
indeterminate term of 5 and 1h years. The Court also imposed restitution in the
amount of $34,569.96. R 164-166.
This appeal timely follows. R 170-174; 180-184.

C. Statement of Facts
The State opened its case with Mukesh Mittal's testimony that in 2010, he
wrote a check for $652.01 to A&A for its services. Tr. p. 107, ln. 2-7. The check was
withdrawn from his account. Tr. p. 108, ln. 2-5. The image of the check after it was
negotiated showed that someone had added the name Ana Garcia to the "pay to the
order of' section. State's Ex. 4, Ex. CD p. 141. Mr. Mittal did not write that name
on the check, nor did he give anyone permission to alter the check. Tr. p. 111, ln. 3-

3

22.
The State also presented the testimony of Richard Pavelek, the secretary of
Terra Nativa Homeowner's Association. Tr. p. 114, In. 8-p. 115, In. 3. On October
28, 2010, he wrote a check to A&A on behalf of the HOA for $1875.00. Tr. p. 117,
ln. 17-21. Between the time he wrote it and the time it was negotiated, someone
added the name "Ana Garcia" to the "pay to the order" section. State's Ex. 5, Ex.
CD p. 142, 148. He did not give anyone permission to add that name to the check.
Tr. p. 122, ln. 19-23.
The State then offered the testimony of Federico Munoz, an employee and
cousin, of the owners of A&A. Tr. p. 127, ln. 7-p. 128, ln. 25. He took over Ms.
Herreman-Garcia'sjob with A&A when she left the company. Tr. p. 128, ln. 7-p.
130, ln. 12.
Mr. Munoz testified that he investigated Mr. Mittal's check and found that
rather than depositing the check, a credit had been applied to his account. Tr. p.
131, ln. 4-10.
As soon as it became apparent that the State intended to offer Mr. Munoz's
testimony as to payroll records of and pay checks issued to Ms. Herreman-Garcia,
she objected. Tr. p. 132, In. 8-25. Counsel argued that the payroll records and
checks were not relevant to the charges in the information. The Court responded
that the evidence was relevant to Count I, grand theft. Counsel stated that Count I
charged theft of cash and so payroll records and checks were not relevant. The
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Court replied, "That's not how Count I is framed. It is framed as in excess of $1000,
so the objection is overruled." Tr. p. 133, ln. 1-23.
Shortly later, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel was allowed to
add to the objection. He argued that the State was engaged in a "very big bait and
switch." Specifically, the information charged that Ms. Herreman-Garcia "did
wrongfully take cash" and at the preliminary hearing the State offered evidence of
cash withdrawals made with an ATM card and the two checks which were alleged to
be forged. Now at trial, the State was offering evidence of time cards and payroll
checks, an entirely different mode of theft. Counsel asserted that this is was a
complete surprise. Counsel argued that the evidence was irrelevant to the charge in
the information and was also improper IRE 404(b) propensity evidence, and even if
it was relevant and admissible under IRE 404(b), it should still be excluded under
IRE 403 as it is extremely prejudicial. Tr. p. 137, ln. 16-p. 139, ln. 15. 1
The State argued that the defense could not be surprised as the payroll
records and checks had been provided in discovery. Tr. p. 141, ln. 1-10. Defense
counsel responded that theft of cash using the ATM card is different than theft
through false time cards. Defense counsel concluded with the argument that if the
payroll records and checks were now to be used, his client was denied her right to a
preliminary hearing. Tr. p. 142, In. 16-p. 145, In. 17.
The Court overruled the objection, noting that there was a reference to

The State never gave IRE 404(b) notice of its intent to introduce other bad
acts evidence. R 2-6.
1
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double paychecks at the preliminary hearing. Tr. p. 148, ln. 1-4. That reference
was as follows:

Q [by Prosecutor}: Other than the fraudulent activity that you were
alleging against Ms. Herreman, are you aware of any other problems
with these checks?
A [Martina Garcia-Caro, part owner of A&A]: The checks that have
been presented so far [Mittal and Terra Nativa checks], or are you
referring to other checks?

Q: Just any of the checks that you provided to the police.
A: I gave them more checks. There are payroll checks. There is double
payroll checks in 2010.

Q: Okay. You are saying Ms. Herreman did that?
A:Yes.
Prelim. T. p. 45, ln. 4-16.
Mr. Munoz's trial testimony continued. He testified as to State's Exhibits 1
and 2, which included a number of time cards filled out for "Giselle" and paychecks
for Ms. Herreman-Garcia and copies of 10 checks other than payroll drawn on
A&A's account payable to Ms. Herreman-Garcia and signed by Antonia Ayon or
Martina Garcia, owners of the company. Tr. p. 151, ln. 19-p. 158, ln. 25. State's Ex.
1 and 2.
Antonio Ayon testified that he is a part owner of A&A along with Martina
Garcia and Alejandro Ayon. Alejandro and Martina are married. The business
operates in Boise and in North Dakota. Tr. p. 171, ln. 23-p. 172, ln. 25. Ms.
Herreman-Garcia is Martina Garcia's niece. Tr. p. 173, ln. 10-18.
6

Ms. Berreman-Garcia worked at A&A in Boise from the end of 2009 through
October 2011. She was in charge of the office, payroll, time sheets, vendor
payments, and invoicing. Mr. Ayon could not remember if anyone else helped her
with those jobs. Tr. p. 175, ln.1-p. 176, ln. 7. Mr. Ayon, as part-owner, was
responsible for signing the checks. Sometimes in emergencies, he would give her
permission to sign on his behalf and then he would review the checks later.
However, he also testified that he just signed checks and did not pay too much
attention. Tr. p. 176, ln. 8-p. 178, ln. 20.
Mr. Ayon testified that Ms. Berreman-Garcia was never given authority to
receive paychecks for hours she did not work nor to receive more than one paycheck
per pay period. Tr. p. 179, ln. 1-8.
Mr. Ayon also testified that the business had multiple debit cards associated
with its checking account at U.S. Bank. The bank account was to be used for
business purposes only, but sometimes the owners used it for personal expenses.
However, employees were never given authority to use the account for personal
expenses. Some employees were allowed to use the debit cards for work related
items. But, Ms. Herreman-Garcia was not given authority to use a debit card. Tr.
p. 179, ln. 11-24.
Mr. Ayon testified that Ms. Berreman-Garcia was responsible for invoicing
and entering payments in the books. However, she was never given authority to
receive customer payments in her own name. Tr. p. 181, ln. 6-20.
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In October 2011, Mr. Ayon deposited money in U.S. Bank and looked at his
He asked to see a statement, and he saw that there were some expenses
that did not belong to A&A. Tr. p. 183, In. 4-p. 12.
At this point, defense counsel again objected as the information referred to
cash transactions and the State was now introducing evidence that did not involve
cash but rather involved the purchase of goods and services using a card. Counsel
also objected on IRE 404(b) grounds. Tr. p. 184, In. 13-23; p. 185, ln. 20-23. The
Court overruled, holding that the evidence was relevant on multiple grounds both
as to the offense charged and as to the fact that Mr. Ayon discovered what was
going on and made further inquiry. Tr. p. 185, ln. 10-16.
Mr. Ayon testified that he figured out that Ms. Herreman-Garcia was the one
making the purchases and withdrawing money because some of the debits occurred
in San Francisco, where she had gone on a trip. Tr. p. 186, In. 6-p. 187, ln. 7.
Mr. Ayon had the bank cancel the card. Tr. p. 188, In. 7-8.
Mr. Ayon thought that the card in question was intended for use by his
brother Alejandro, but he was not sure. In June 2011, Alejandro began working in
North Dakota and the card was simply to be kept in the desk Ms. Herreman-Garcia
used in the Boise office. It was to be used only in an emergency with Mr. Ayon's
permission. Between June and October 2011, it should not have been used. Tr. p.
189, In. 20-p. 192, In. 11.
Mr. Ayon asked Ms. Herreman-Garcia why she did this thing to him and she
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told him she was sorry and she had taken money because she needed it because she
had cancer. He told her that he would help her if she asked, but this was not the
way to do it. She hugged him and he waited to discuss this with Martina Garcia.
Tr. p. 194, ln. 11-p. 195, ln. 4.
Mr. Ayon asked Ms. Berreman-Garcia to leave the Boise job and "call it
done." She told him that she was going to repay him everything and told him that
he could take her cars. He told her, "No." Then she offered to pay him $3000 every
three months, but he told her to pay $1000 every month. So they entered a written
agreement which they had notarized on December 12, 2011. Tr. p. 195, ln. 8-p. 196,
ln. 16.
The agreement states:
I, Ana Giselle Berreman Garcia, agree that I owe Antonio Ayon for the
sum of $18,056.44 with a 12% annual interest rate totaling to the
amount of $21,306.70. If paid in full prior to October 2013 total
amount may be less interest being paid and that I will pay the sum in
accordance with the following terms:
1. I will pay and (sic) installment of $1000.00 each
month.
2. The first installment must be made to Antonio Ayon no
later than January 1, 2012.
3. Every following installment must be made to Antonio
Ayon no later the (sic) 5th day of every month until it is
paid in full.
4. Should three consecutive installments not be paid on
time, Antonio Ayon, without any further notice may
cancel this agreement and undertake legal action
proceedings to recover the outstanding sum and all legal
9

costs.
5. I agree to notify Antonio Ayon immediately if I change
my address or telephone number. I understand that if I
do not notify Antonio Ayon of such changes, without any
further notice he may cancel this agreement and
undertake legal action for recovery of the sum and all
legal costs.
State's Ex. 7.
On the second page of the agreement, the notary described it as an
"Agreement to pay Debt." Id.
Mr. Ayon testified that he did not remember exactly what the sum in the
agreement represented, and it might include items not related to the debit card, but
primarily it referred to use of the debit card. Tr. p. 201, ln. 11-p. 202, ln. 10.
Mr. Ayon further testified that Ms. Herreman-Garcia made some payments,
but not all. And, so he believed that he should make a police report. Tr. p. 200, ln.
11-p. 201, ln. 4.
After he made the agreement, he was contacted by Mr. Mittal and the HOA
saying that they had paid bills that had not been recorded on A&A's books. When
they sent him the cancelled checks he saw Ms. Herreman-Garcia's name on the pay
to the order line and concluded she had cashed the checks. Tr. p. 202, ln. 25-p. 204,
ln. 15. However, she did not have permission to do this. Tr. p. 206, ln. 12-19.
A&A was audited by the government beginning in December 2012. Tr. p.
206, ln. 24-p. 207, ln. 2. In the audit, they learned that there were some "double
checks" issued to Ms. Herreman-Garcia, including pay checks. Tr. p. 207, ln. 9-0.
10

208, ln. 3. State's Exhibit 2 includes those checks. Tr. p. 208, In. 6-25.
Mr. Ayon does not know why the checks were issued to her. Two of them
contain his authentic signature, but when he signs checks he does not pay attention
to what he is signing. Tr. p. 209, ln. 7-p. 210, p. 21.
Mr. Ayon also testified that he does not know who signed his name on the
checks that did not have his "authentic" signature. Tr. p. 222, ln. 19-p. 225, ln. 2.
The checks which did not have his authentic signature had his name written in a
variety of ways inconsistent with one another and with his actual signature. Tr. p.
226, ln. 13-p. 231, ln. 20. He had at times given Ms. Herreman-Garcia authority to
sign checks in emergencies, but he had not given anyone else that authority. Tr. p.
235, ln. 22-p. 236, ln. 6. Of the inauthentic signatures, he believed one is possibly
Ms. Berreman-Garcia's, but he could not testify that it was hers. Tr. p. 238, ln. 1418. Mr. Ayon testified that probably the other owners had signed his name to
checks. As for the "Ana Garcia" added to the Mittal and HOA checks, he did not
think one of the other owners added the words, but that was "just my feelings." Tr.
p. 242, ln. 1-13.
Mr. Ayon did not go to the police until 2013. By that time, Ms. HerremanGarcia no longer worked for the Boise office. However, the other two owners of the
company had hired her to work in the North Dakota office, despite knowing Mr.
Ayon's allegations of theft. Tr. p. 250, ln. 9-252, ln. 18.
Martina Garcia, a co-owner of A&A and Ms. Berreman-Garcia's aunt,
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testified that Ms. Berreman-Garcia ran everything in the office. Tr. p. 262, ln. 12-p.
264, ln. 19. She also testified that Ms. Berreman-Garcia was never given a debit
card connected to A&A's account and that she was never authorized to use such a
card. Tr. p. 267, In. 2-8.
The card at issue in this case was, according to Ms. Garcia, primarily used by
Alejandro Ayon who by June 2011 was in North Dakota. The card was to be kept in
Ms. Berreman-Garcia's desk. Tr. p. 268, In. 1-12.
Ms. Garcia testified as to State's Exhibit 8, bank statements for the account
connected with the card. Over defense objections on the basis of IRE 404(b), 403,
and 402, she was allowed to testify as to transactions in San Francisco in October
2011. These included an ATM withdrawal for $303. When she saw the California
transactions, she knew that Ms. Berreman-Garcia was using the card because she
had requested permission at the office to travel to San Francisco. Tr. p. 272, In. 1524. However, she did not have permission to use the card there. Tr. p. 273, In. 6-7.
Ms. Garcia and Ms. Berreman-Garcia's mother met with Ms. HerremanGarcia. Ms. Berreman-Garcia admitted that she had used the card and said that
she was very sorry. Following this, Antonio fired her from the Boise office. Tr. p.
273, In. 13-p. 274, In. 7.
Later, over Antonio's objection, Ms. Garcia and her husband Alejandro hired
Ms. Berreman-Garcia to work in the North Dakota office to give her a chance to
repay what she owed on the card. Tr. p. 274, In. 8-p. 275, In. 2.
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Ms. Garcia testified that they waited until October 2013 to report the alleged
thefts to the police because it was only then, through A&A's IRS audit that they
discovered that Ms. Berreman-Garcia had been paying herself for hours she had not
worked. Tr. p. 278, ln. 2-p. 280, ln. 16. Unlike Mr. Ayon, Ms. Garcia testified that
she recognized Ms. Berreman-Garcia's handwriting on several of the checks which
bore his name but not his signature. She also recognized Ms. Berreman-Garcia's
signature on the reverse side of the checks endorsing them. Ms. Garcia testified
that Ms. Berreman-Garcia can imitate other's handwriting. Tr. p. 281, ln. 22-p.
287, ln. 25. She further testified that Alejandro has always had authority to sign
Antonio Ayon's name on A&A checks. Tr. p. 293, ln. 9-10.
Ms. Garcia contacted the police in 2013, about a month or two after Ms.
Berreman-Garcia and Ms. Garcia's brother, Hugo, opened their own landscape
business in North Dakota in competition with A&A. Tr. p. 307, p. 15-p. 308, ln. 16.
With regard to the unauthorized transactions on the card, Ms. Garcia
testified regarding several transactions for goods and services that she believed Ms.
Berreman-Garcia had wrongfully made. Tr. p. 347, n. 7-p. 351, ln. 14.
Detective Wade Spain of the Boise Police Department testified that he
obtained the records of Ms. Berreman-Garcia's account with Bank of America which
were introduced as State's Exhibit 9. Tr. p. 383, ln. 1-p. 384, ln. 7. Again, defense
counsel lodged an objection based upon IRE 404(b), 403, and 402 which was
overruled. Tr. p. 385, ln. 11-17.
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Detective Spain testified that he investigated four methods of theft in this
case: 1) misuse of the debit card for personal purchases; 2) paychecks paid for time
not worked and/or duplicate paychecks; 3) unauthorized checks coming from A&A to
Ms. Berreman-Garcia for no explainable reason; and 4) misdirected checks payment made to A&A but deposited in Ms. Berreman-Garcia's personal account.
Tr. p. 389, ln. 1-18. State's Exhibit 10 is a summary by Detective Spain listing all
duplicate and excessive paychecks to Ms. Berreman-Garcia and all unexplainable
checks from A&A to her. It was admitted over the on-going defense objection per
IRE 402, 403, and 404(b). Tr. p. 403, ln. 23-p. 404, ln. 4. Exhibit 11 is a comparison
of ATM cash withdrawals from A&A's account with cash deposits into Ms.
Berreman-Garcia's personal account. Detective Spain also discovered that the
Mittal and HOA checks went into Ms. Berreman-Garcia's personal account. Tr. p.
424, ln. 7-14. However, Detective Spain also testified that there was never an
identification of who had actually altered the Mittal and HOA checks. Tr. p. 459, ln.
4-7. Nor was there ever any evidence making the link between the handwriting on
the Mittal and HOA checks pay to the order of additions and Ms. HerremanGarcia's handwriting. Tr. p. 459, ln. 8-18.
Following this evidence, the State rested. Tr. p. 467, ln. 24-p. 468, ln. 2.
The defense presented the testimony of Ms. Berreman-Garcia's brother,
Alfredo Berreman. Mr. Herreman testified that he had worked for A&A, first in
Boise and then in North Dakota, from 2008 to 2013. Tr. p. 481, ln. 16-p. 483, ln. 23.
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Mr. Herreman testified that Antonio Ayon gave several people, including the
other owners, employees, and Mr. Herreman, permission to sign checks with his
name. Tr. p. 486, ln. 20-p. 488, ln. 2. The entire time he worked for A&A he saw
checks that were signed by others with Antonio Ayon's name. Tr. p. 489, ln. 14-p.
490, ln. 12. This was a common practice. Tr. p. 490, ln. 19-p. 491, ln. 2.
To avoid paying overtime, the company had employees record 40 hours even
if they had worked 50 and then raised the wages to actually pay for the extra 10
hours. A&A would also bank the hours and then pay the employees who went home
to Mexico over the holidays to cover the held hours. Tr. p. 492, ln. 2-13. This was
done to avoid paying taxes. Tr. p. 493, ln. 18-20. In addition, A&A would often pay
employees in cash. Tr. p. 496, ln. 12-16.
Mr. Herreman testified that A&A supplied several employees, including him,
with debit cards. The cards were for business but could also be used for per diem
items like lunches and traveling expenses. Also, employees could and did use the
cards to withdraw cash to make payments to truckers moving materials in semis.
Tr. p. 506, ln. 4-p. 507, ln. 18. These were all generally accepted practices at A&A.
Tr. p. 508, ln. 2-11.
While working for A&A, Mr. Herreman saw Ms. Herreman-Garcia pay
workers with cash from the business account. She got the cash from the ATM or by
cashing checks. Tr. p. 508, ln. 12-21.
In June or July 2013, Mr. Herreman left A&A for several reasons including
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the problems with the IRS. When he left, he, Ms. Herreman-Garcia, and Hugo
Garcia (Martina Garcia's brother) started a new landscape business (Landscape
Elements) in North Dakota. Tr. p. 513, ln. 14-p. 515, ln. 7. Landscape Elements
offered basically the same services as A&A in the same town out of the same shop.
In fact, they took many of A&A's customers Tr. p. 515, ln. 22-516, ln. 24. In the first
four months, Landscape Elements had $1.3 million in receipts which was about 25%
of A&A's prior receipts for a similar time period. Martina was very angry about this
and threatened Mr. Herreman and called the police. Tr. p. 517, ln. 14-p. 518, ln. 16.
Ms. Herreman-Garcia testified that she began working for A&A in Boise in
2009. Then in 2011, she moved to North Dakota, living with Martina Garcia and
Alejandro Ayon, and working at the North Dakota A&A. Tr. p. 534, ln. 1-24. She
eventually left the company for a better paying job. Tr. p. 535, ln. 1-13.
Antonio Ayon permitted her to use the company debit card, giving her the
PIN number for it. When she used the card, it was her understanding that she
would have to pay Antonio back. The agreement they signed reflected that
understanding. Tr. p. 536, ln. 13-p. 537, ln. 22.
Shortly after the agreement was signed, Antonio started asking Ms.
Herreman-Garcia if she had friends she wanted to introduce to him, and once he
showed her a flyer for a house for sale and told her that if she became his girlfriend,
he would buy her the house. She laughed and said, "No." But, she also told her
brother Alfredo and talked with Martina and Alejandro about it. Tr. p. 538, ln. 20-
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p. 539, In. 16.
With that evidence the defense rested. Tr. p. 554, ln. 3-4.
The defense also moved for a judgment of acquittal on both charges. Tr. p.
583, ln. 16-p. 586, ln. 17; Tr. p. 586, ln. 22-p. 587, ln. 14.
The Court denied the motions. Tr. p. 592, ln. 19-22.
In instructing the jury, the Court did not give a specific act unanimity
instruction as to either count. R 114-133.
In its closing, the State argued that the case was about greed and that Ms.
Herreman-Garcia repeatedly "followed through with a pattern and plan of stealing
from her employer by stealing in a variety of ways, including the use of paychecks,
writing herself extra paychecks, overpaying herself on paychecks, using her
employer's debit card when that became available for her, and stealing money from
the checks that she had forged." Tr. p. 614, ln. 1-13.
With regard to unanimity, the State told the jury in closing:
You have many, many thousands of dollars in value that was stolen
from A&A Landscape. There was a lot of separate individual
transactions. Again, you are not being called upon, nor do you have to
decide unanimously upon each and every single theft as far as the
grand theft is concerned.
What you have to be convinced of beyond a reasonable doubt is
whether as part of that scheme or plan the aggregation of her conduct
shows you beyond a reasonable doubt that she stole over $1000.
Okay? So you don't have to find beyond a reasonable doubt whether,
in fact, she was the one who purchased the food at the Boise Panda
Express or whether she did that ATM withdrawal or that one. So long
as you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that she at least stole
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over $1,000 as part of that scheme or plan. Okay?
Tr. p. 631, In. 25-p. 632, In. 18.
The defense argued that there was no intent to defraud as demonstrated by
the agreement Ms. Herreman-Garcia signed with Antonio. Tr. p. 639, ln. 8-16.
Rather, A&A brought these false claims of theft as a retaliation for Ms. HerremanGarcia and her partners forming Landscape Elements in North Dakota which in
just the first three months of operations took over a million dollars worth of
business from A&A. This was proven by the fact that there was an agreement for
repayment, Ms. Herreman-Garcia remained in the employ of A&A, and the police
were not called until Landscape Elements was formed. Tr. p. 640, ln. 1-p. 641, ln.
21. Counsel also discussed evidence that Antonio gave Ms. Herreman-Garcia
permission to use the debit card and only got upset about it when she refused his
advances. Tr. p. 654, ln. 11-p. 655, ln. 9. Further counsel noted that everything
was out in the open - no effort was taken by Ms. Herreman-Garcia to hide anything
from A&A and consistently with a debt and not with theft. Tr. p. 661, ln. 23-p. 663,
ln. 5.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. In Count I, grand theft, the information failed to meet the state and
federal constitutional due process requirements of factual specificity adequate to
enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and to shield
against double jeopardy. U.S. Const. Amends. 5, 6, and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I, §
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See, I.C. §§ 19-1303, 19-1418 and ICR 7(b). Is this failure structural error that
vacation of the conviction and by extension the forgery conviction because
the lack of notice led to a failure to defend which was prejudicial to both counts?
B. The jury was not instructed that it must unanimously agree as to which
instances of theft were committed in Count I or as to which instance of forgery was
committed in Count II. And, in closing the prosecutor instructed the jury that it did
not need to unanimously agree as to what offenses were committed. Was the failure
to instruct fundamental error that requires reversal of both convictions?
C. The District Court made objected to evidentiary errors, including
admission of irrelevant IRE 404(b) evidence without proper notice and excluding
relevant evidence needed to establish a defense. Do these errors require reversal of
both convictions?

IV.ARGUMENT
A. The Failure to Give Notice of the Charge of Theft Sufficient to Allow
Ms. Berreman-Garcia to Prepare and Present a Defense Resulted in
Structural Error that Requires Vacation of Both Convictions.
Count I of the information accused Ms. Herreman-Garcia of"Grand Theft,
Felony, LC. § 18-2403(1), 2407(1)(b), 2409" committed as follows:
That the Defendant, ANA GISELLE HERREMAN GARCIA, on or
between the 9th day of March, 2009 and the 3l8t day of October, 2011,
.in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did wrongfully take cash of a
value in excess of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) lawful money of
the United States, form the owner, A&A Landscape, with the intent to
appropriate to herself certain property of another.
R 52-53.
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This allegation does not meet the due process requirements of providing
specificity sufficient to allow a person of common understanding to know
what is intended and to shield from double jeopardy. This denial of due process
created structural error which requires vacation of both convictions.
Informations serve two purposes: 1) to establish the court's subject matter
jurisdiction; and 2) to satisfy the constitutional due process requirements of
adequate notice so as to allow the accused to prepare a meaningful defense and be
protected against double jeopardy. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757-58, 101 P.3d
699, 701-02; State v. Banks, 113 Idaho 54, 58, 740 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Ct.App. 1987).
An information establishes subject matter jurisdiction if it alleges that the
offense was committed in Idaho and names the applicable code section. State v.

Jones, 140 Idaho at 759, 101 P.3d at 703. In a theft case, the State's failure to
specify the theories involved does not impair the establishment of subject matter
jurisdiction. State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 925-28, 935 P.2d 183, 188-91 (Ct.App.
1997).
However, to meet the due process requirements, an information must be
specific enough to advise the accused as to particular section of the statute he or she
is being charged with having violated and, further, must set forth a concise
statement of the facts constituting the alleged offense sufficient that the particular
offense may be identified with certainty as to time, place, and persons involved.

State v. Dorsey, 139 Idaho 149, 151, 75 P.3d 203, 205 (Ct. App. 2003), citing State v.
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Grady, 89 Idaho 204, 211, 404 P.2d 347,351 (1965).
Mere recitation of the statutory language is not necessarily sufficient to
satisfy the due process requirements. The appellate courts have made it clear that
in both manslaughter and theft cases, because the crime may be committed by a
multitude of methods and conduct, mere repetition of the statutory language may
not be sufficient. Dorsey, supra. Thus, State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 65 P.2d
156 (1937), held that an information charging a doctor with manslaughter was not
sufficient when the prosecutor did not state how, or in what manner, or by what
means the doctor committed the crime. And, in State v. Owen, supra, the Court held
that informations charging Ms. Owens with grand theft by reference to LC.§§ 182403(1) and 18-2407(1) without specifying a particular method or way that each
theft was committed did not satisfy the due process requirements. However, in that
case, because Ms. Owens had a preliminary hearing wherein the State disclosed the
evidence demonstrating its theory with regard to the circumstances, method,
manner, or way each charged theft was committed, she suffered no prejudice. 129
Idaho at 927-28, 935 P.2d at 190-91. In a footnote, the Court of Appeals cautioned
that the due process argument raised by Ms. Owens may well be revived in a case
wherein an accused waives the preliminary hearing, or wherein the prosecutor
proceeds by way of a grand jury indictment without affording a preliminary
hearing. The Court advised the State that to avoid a due process problem, it should
ignore LC. § 18-2409(1) and insert language similar to that used in State v. Darbin,
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109 Idaho 516, 518-19, 708 P.2d 921, 923-24 (Ct. App. 1985), stating the way the
defendant committed the theft. State v. Owen, 129 Idaho at 928, 935 P.2d at 191,
ftnt. 8.
In this case, the State chose to rely upon I.C. § 18-2409(1) and did not inform
Ms. Harreman-Garcia of the means of committing theft with which she was
charged. And, then, even though there was a preliminary hearing, the State chose
not to present evidence of all the means by which it intended to prove its case.
Rather, it presented only evidence of theft by use of the ATM card to make cash
withdrawals and purchases. Only at trial did the State reveal its intent to prove its
case by not only the ATM charges and withdrawals, but also by proof of paychecks
paid for time not worked and/or duplicate paychecks and unauthorized checks
coming from A&A to Ms. Herreman-Garcia for no explainable reason. Tr. p. 389, ln.
1-18.
This expansion of the means of the theft clearly took the defense by surprise.
In his opening statement, defense counsel outlined a defense to the ATM charges
and withdrawals, stating that the Ayon brothers told Ms. Herreman-Garcia that
she could use the card for personal needs with the intent that eventually it would
all be repaid as evidenced by their notarized agreement for repayment. And, with
regard to the two checks wherein her name was added to the pay to the order of
line, counsel stated that Antonio Ayon had written her name in himself and told her
to deposit the money in her account so as to help her out financially. Tr. p. 95, ln.

22

11-p. 96, ln. 23. Counsel offered no defense theory regarding unauthorized
paychecks and the other unauthorized checks. Tr. p. 94, In. 10-p. 101, In. 9. Then,
when the State began offering testimony of payroll irregularities, counsel
immediately objected that this evidence was not relevant to the charge of theft.
However, the District Court overruled the objection. Counsel replied, "Why is that?
Maybe I'm misinterpreting." Tr. p. 132, In. 24-p. 133, ln. 22. A few minutes later,
counsel said, "I'm going to have a very big objection coming up." Tr. 134, In. 20-21.
As soon as a break was taken, counsel objected stating that the State appeared to be
engaged in a "big bait and switch." Tr. p. 137, In. 16-18. Counsel went on to point
out that at the preliminary hearing, they were presented with only the ATM proof
and the two allegedly forged checks. Now, the State was presenting an entirely
different mode of theft. Counsel offered a relevance objection, an IRE 404(b)
objection, and an IRE 403 objection. Counsel further argued that his client was
entitled to notice of the charges that were to be faced so that she could rebut that
and that when that was not provided through the information or the preliminary
hearing, there was error. Tr. p. 137, In. 16-p. 145, ln. 18. Counsel stated," ... it is
a complete change of the charge, and she is being basically denied her right to
confront this at preliminary." Tr. p. 145, In. 10-13.
The State offered that it was not required to provide an accused with "an
itemized notice of exactly how we intend to prove all of the charges" and that
counsel knew through discovery that there were payroll and other check
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irregularities. Tr. p. 143, ln. 22-p. 145, ln. 3.
The District Court denied the defense objection. After the Court's statement
of the reason for denial, Tr. p. 147, ln. 13-p. 140, In. 3, defense counsel stated that
he had specifically asked the Judge at the preliminary hearing, "What exactly is
being bound over?" to avoid this sort of surprise. Tr. p. 150, ln. 4-7. The Court
replied, "The means is not required to be detailed in the Information. The only
purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine if there is probable cause to
believe that a Defendant is the one who committed it." Tr. p. 147, ln. 13-p. 150, ln.
18.
The trial carried on. Defense counsel interposed unsuccessful IRE 402, 403,
and 404(b) objections throughout to evidence other than the ATM transactions and
the Mittal and HOA checks. And, the District Court denied the objections. Tr. p.
132, ln. 3-193, ln. 20; Tr. p. 156, ln. 7-13; p. 184, ln. 13-p. 185, ln. 25; p. 187, ln. 8-p.
188, ln. 14; p. 212, ln. 7-13; p. 270, ln. 22-24; p. 385, ln. 11-17; p. 403, ln.22-p. 404,
ln. 4; p. 411, ln. 2-6; p. 418, ln. 3.
In support of his objections, defense counsel stated:
Oh, certainly I had the information, Your Honor, but I have been under
the understanding this entire time that what was going to be
presented at trial was what was presented - would come under the
plan that presented at the preliminary hearing, which is the use of the
ATM card for cash, and the use of the - the forgery of the [Mittal and
HOA] checks.
Tr. 142, ln. 25-p. 143, ln. 7.
Counsel asked for a recess when the State presented Exhibit 2, copies of 10
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checks made out to Ms. Herreman-Garcia, to discuss the exhibit with his client. His
request was made in the presence of the jury and it was clear that this discussion
was necessary because the exhibit had not been anticipated in light of the State's
information and preliminary hearing evidence and was not prepared to crossexamine on it. Tr. p. 160, ln. 2-16.
Defense counsel's objection to the lack of notice should have been sustained.
As set out in State u. Owen, supra, a mere reference to the theft statute without any
indication of the means of theft being alleged, does not satisfy constitutional due
process requirements. And, while the lack of notice can be compensated for by
presentation of the State's theory of the case at the preliminary hearing, in this
case, the State did not present any theory other than theft by use of the ATM card
and the Mittal and HOA checks in the preliminary hearing. Ms. Herreman-Garcia
thus did not have adequate notice so that she could prepare a defense. Moreover,
the lack of notice was prejudicial as evidenced by defense counsel's opening
statement and objections and request for recess which indicated that counsel had
only prepared a defense to theft by use of the ATM card and the Mittal and HOA
checks. Counsel had not prepared a defense to any claims of theft by alteration of
payroll records, taking unearned payroll checks, or taking other checks simply made
out to Ms. Herreman-Garcia. On this basis, Ms. Herreman-Garcia's conviction for
theft should be reversed.
Likewise, the State's actions in this case effectively denied due process by
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denying Ms. Berreman-Garcia a preliminary hearing on the means of theft other
the ATM transactions and Mittal and HOA checks. As noted in State u.

Stewart-Meyers, 145 Idaho 605, 607, 181 P.3d 531, 533, ftnt. 1, (Ct.App. 2008),
defendants have a due process right to a preliminary hearing. Id., citing Goodwin
u. Page, 296 F.Supp. 1205, 1211 (E.D. Okla. 1969) (holding a preliminary hearing is

a "vital process" such that the denial thereof violates due process); Buckley u. Hall,
215 Mo. 93, 114 S.W. 954, 955 (1908) (declaring that whether or not a defendant
received a preliminary hearing goes to the regularity of the previous proceedings;

State u. O'Connor, 31 N.C. App. 518, 229 S.E.2d 705 (1976) (analyzing the denial of
a preliminary hearing as a question of due process); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 456
(2006) (failure to give preliminary hearing may be cause for reversing or setting
aside a conviction.); and Gray u. Raines, 662 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1981) (right to
notice of a charge is basic and the most clearly established due process right of an
accused in a criminal proceeding and a denial of this right is a per se violation). See

also, State u. Woodmansee, 124 Vt. 387, 205 A.2d 407 (1964)(an accused is entitled
to have an information reasonably indicate the exact offense so as to enable the
intelligent preparation of a defense).
The defense did object in this case to the lack of notice and to the lack of a
preliminary hearing as soon as it was aware that the State intended to present
evidence of means of theft other than those indicated by either the information or
the preliminary hearing. While the District Court overruled the objection, in fact,
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error was, as well be explained, a structural error, which requires vacation and
remand. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227-228, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80 (2010).
The error was a structural error because it affected the basic structure of the
trial to the point that the trial could not reliably serve its function as a vehicle for
the determination of guilt or innocence. Id. As set out in Arizona v. Fulminate, 499
U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991), some errors are so basic to a fair trial that the
violation requires an automatic reversal not subject to any harmless error analysis.
These errors affect "the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than
simply an error in the trial process itself' and thus are so inherently unfair that
they are not subject to a harmless error analysis. Id. at 307-08, 310, 111 S.Ct. at
1264, 1265. See also, State v. Umphenour,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _ , 2015 WL
1423789 *5 (March 30, 2015), petition for review granted.
A trial held without notice to the accused such that she could not develop and
present a meaningful defense is infected with structural error. A trial without
notice is inherently unfair. And, the error is an error "with consequences that are
necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate," Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,
282, 113 S.Ct. 2078 (1993), which must be remedied without a harmless error
analysis. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2665
(2006). In Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court found structural error in the denial of the
right to counsel of choice noting that it is impossible to know what different choices
the rejected counsel would have made and then to quantify the impact of those
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different choices on the outcome of the proceedings. "Harmless-error analysis in
a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an
alternate universe." 548 U.S. at 150, 126 S.Ct. at 2565. Likewise here, it is
impossible to know what defense would have been presented had Ms. HerremanGarcia had notice of all of the methods of theft the State intended to prove. The
error carried consequences unquantifiable and indeterminate. The error was a
structural error that requires vacation of both the theft and forgery convictions
because the lack of a prepared defense to all of the theft evidence was highly
prejudicial to both charges in the same way irrelevant prior bad acts are highly
prejudicial. 2

Even if counsel had not objected, the due process violation was a
fundamental error which requires vacation of the conviction. While ICR 12(b)(2)
requires objections to defects in the information to be raised prior to trial, the defect
here could not be raised prior to trial because it was not known prior to trial. The
defect was not known until the State, at trial, presented evidence of means of theft
other than those presented in the preliminary hearing. Moreover, even ICR 12(b)
errors are subject to a fundamental error analysis. State v. Morris, 116 Idaho 834,
836, 780 P.2d 156, 158 (Ct. App. 1989). State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227-28, 245
P.3d 961, 979-80 (2010) (in the case of structural errors "the appellate court shall
automatically vacate and remand"). See also, State v. Umphenour, supra at *5 (a
constitutionally invalid waiver of a jury trial is a structural defect which requires
automatic vacation under Perry).
2

The lack of due process in this case meets Perry's fundamental error
requirements because it violated Ms. Herreman-Garcia's unwaived right to due
process; it plainly exists without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record; and as structural error it was not harmless. Perry,
supra.
28

B. The District Court Committed Fundamental Error in Failing to

Give Unanimity Instructions
Both convictions must also be reversed because of the lack of a specific act
unanimity instruction. A defendant's right to a unanimous jury is guaranteed in
Idaho by Article 1, § 7 of the state constitution which requires that a verdict in a
felony case be unanimous. Idaho Code § 19-2301 also requires the jurors to
unanimously agree before a verdict may be returned and I.C. § 19-2316 requires
that a jury must be sent out for further deliberations if a poll of the jurors shows a
non-unanimous verdict. See also ICR 3l(a).
However, the District Court did not give a specific act unanimity instruction
as to either count in this case. R 114-33. This was fundamental error because the
State presented evidence that Ms. Herreman-Garcia committed several temporally
discrete acts of both theft (both grand and petit) and forgery which would
independently support convictions of the charged crimes. State u. Southwick, 158
Idaho 173, 181-82, 345 P.3d 232, 240-41 (Ct. App. 2014). This error was
compounded when the State argued in closing, "There was a lot of separate
individual transactions. Again, you are not being called upon, nor do you have to
decide unanimously upon each and every single theft as far as the grand theft is
concerned." Tr. p. 632, ln. 2-6.
Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law subject to
free review. State v. Southwick, 158 Idaho at 181, 345 P.3d at 240. When
reviewing instructions, the appellate court considers whether the instructions as a
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whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law. Id.
Even without a contemporaneous objection at trial, an appellate court may
review instructional error under the fundamental error doctrine. Id. The appellant
must show that 1) the alleged error violates one or more of her unwaived
constitutional rights; 2) the alleged error is clear or obvious without the need for
reference to any additional information not contained in the appellate record; and 3)
there is a reasonable possibility that the alleged error affected the outcome of the
trial proceedings. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
A trial court is required to instruct a jury that, in order to convict, it must
unanimously agree on the defendant's guilt. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 4 7 4,
272 P.3d 417, 446 (2012). However, in general, a court does not have to instruct
that the jury must unanimously agree as to the underlying facts giving rise to the
offense. Adamcik, supra. An exception to this general principle applies in cases
where there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction may occur
as a result of different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different
criminal acts. State v. Southwick, 158 Idaho at 181, 345 P.3d at 240; State u. Gain,
140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 2004). When evidence is presented
that the defendant has committed several temporally discrete acts, each of which
would independently support a conviction for the crime charged, the court must
instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on the specific incident
constituting the offense in each count, regardless of whether the defendant requests
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such an instruction. State u. Southwick, supra, citing State u. Severson, 14 7 Idaho
711, 215 P.3d 414, 431 (2008); State u. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 957-58, 231 P.3d
104 7, 1054-55 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172-73, 90 P.3d 920,
922-23 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 167-68, 90 P.3d 910, 91718 (Ct. App. 2004); Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 266-68, 16 P.3d 937, 942-44 (Ct.
App. 2000). In the alternative, jury unanimity may be protected by the State
electing the incident upon which it will rely for conviction. State v. Southwick,

supra, citing State u. Gain, 140 Idaho at 172-73, 90 P.3d at 922-23.
In this case, the State presented evidence of many temporally discrete
instances of theft - both grand theft and petit theft - against A&A. State's Exhibit
10 summarized its allegations of theft. It included 33 alleged temporarily discrete
acts of petit theft by means of duplicate or unauthorized pay totaling $9,249.53; 10
alleged temporally discrete acts of theft (7 petit, 3 grand) in the form of checks made
out to Giselle Herreman or Giselle Gonzalez totaling $7492.19; and 16 alleged
temporally discrete petit theft instances of ATM withdrawals totaling $6205.50. In
addition, the State presented evidence of alleged petit theft of the Mittal check
totaling $652.01, State's Ex. 3, and alleged grand theft of the HOA check totaling
$1875.00. State's Ex. 5. Furthermore, the State presented evidence of numerous
separate debit card purchases which it alleged were theft. State's Ex. 8.
Given all these separate alleged instances of theft, and the two separate
alleged incidents of forgery, a specific act unanimity instruction was required and
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failure to give it was fundamental error. The failure to instruct was a violation
Ms. Herreman-Garcia's unwaived constitutional rights to due process and a
unanimous verdict. See Tr. p. 566, ln. 12-20, wherein defense counsel argues that
the State should have selected a single incident rather than have been allowed to
present evidence of multiple incidents. The error plainly exists without reference to
information outside the appellate record. Nothing beyond the trial transcripts and
the clerk's record is required to determine that a unanimity instruction was
required and was not given. And, there is a reasonable probability that the error
affected the outcome of the trial. With regard to the theft charge, Ms. HerremanGarcia had a defense to several of the incidents of alleged theft

she was given

access to the Mittal and HOA checks and the ATM/debit card with Antonio's
knowledge that she was using the money for herself and indeed, she had no intent
to appropriate the money as she signed a promissory note and made repayments.
lri fact, A&A hired her in the North Dakota office after she left Boise to allow her to
continue to make her payments on the promissory note - an indication that the
company did not consider her a thief. It defies all logic that if the company truly
considered Ms. Herreman-Garcia a thief, it would hire her in North Dakota to
manage its office with apparently unlimited and unmonitored access to
opportunities to steal. With regard to the other checks, Antonio Ayon testified that
he gave Ms. Herreman-Garcia permission to sign checks and he then reviewed them
later. Tr. p. 176, ln. 21-p. 177, ln. 14. He further testified that when Ms.
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Herreman-Garcia made out checks for him to sign he could inspect them, but did
not do so closely. Tr. p. 177, In. 15-p. 178, In. 20. And, Alfredo Herreman testified
that A&A typically allowed employees besides the owners to have ATM cards and
use those cards for personal expenses and also to use the cards for cash withdrawals
which were used to pay people like employees and truckers in cash. He testified
that Ms. Berreman-Garcia paid employees in cash per these practices. Tr. p. 506,
ln. 4-p. 508, ln. 21. In short, there were defenses to the charges.
Moreover, as to both counts, there are several other potential defenses. For
example, that Ms. Berreman-Garcia was simply following A&A's business practices
of paying people in cash so as to either avoid payroll taxes or problems with the
hiring of undocumented workers and that the impetus to suddenly report these
issues to the police after they had gone on for years and after A&A had actually
hired Ms. Herreman-Garcia a second time to work in North Dakota was either as a
punishment for not accepting the sexual advances of Mr. Ayon, a scapegoating of
Ms. Herreman-Garcia to attempt to avoid tax or other legal problems as a result of
the IRS audit, or as retribution for opening a new business which decreased the
profitability of A&A in North Dakota.
In any event, there is a reasonable probability that not all the jurors agreed
on any one instance of either theft or forgery and that had the jury been properly
instructed as to unanimity the outcome of the trial would have been different.
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C. Objected to Evidentiary Errors Also Require Reversal

This Court should vacate the convictions because of the due process error. It
should reverse also because of the fundamental error in failing to give unanimity
instructions. Further, both convictions should be reversed because of objected to
erroneous evidentiary rulings by the District Court which the State cannot now
prove harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, supra.
1. Admission of Irrelevant Inadmissible Other Bad Acts Evidence

Should this Court find that Ms. Herreman-Garcia was not given proper notice
of the any allegations of theft other than the ATM cash withdrawals, but that the
error was not structural, and engages in a harmless error analysis, it will have to
find that the State can prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt because the defense did object to the lack of notice. State v. Perry, supra.
The State cannot prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. One
reason that the State cannot carry its burden, is that as a result of the due process
violation it was allowed to present evidence of all the other improperly charged
means of theft over defense relevancy, IRE 404(b) and 403 objections. As set out
below, these objections would have been sustained but for the due process
violations.
Defense counsel objected repeatedly throughout the trial to the admission of
evidence of means of theft not properly charged because the defense was not given
the notice required by the constitutional due process protections. He objected
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because the evidence was not relevant, it was impermissible IRE 404(b) evidence
and it was inadmissible under IRE 403. Specifically, counsel made the following
objections:
1. During Federico Munoz's testimony, at the first mention of payroll records

and checks, Tr. p. 132, In. 8-24, defense counsel objected on the basis of relevance.
Tr. p. 133, In. 4-p. 134, In. 24. Counsel elaborated that the time cards were an
entirely separate manner of theft from that charged and thus evidence about them
was irrelevant. Tr. p. 137, ln. 16-p. 138, ln. 16. Counsel further objected that the
evidence was evidence of propensity which was not allowed under IRE 404(b). And,
lastly, that even if it was allowed under IRE 404(b), it was precluded by IRE 403 as
it is extremely prejudicial. Tr. p. 139, ln. 4-20.
2. Counsel raised the same objection to the admission of Exhibit 2, copies of
checks made out to Ms. Herreman-Garcia. Tr. p. 156, ln. 7-13.
3. Counsel raised the same objections to Antonio Ayon's testimony about
debit card purchases of goods and services which did not involve cash. Tr. p. 184,
ln. 13-p. 185, ln. 25.
4. Counsel raised the same objections to Mr. Ayon's testimony about
transactions on the ATM card that occurred in California. Tr. p. 187, ln. 8-p. 188,
ln. 14.
5. Counsel raised the same objections to the admission of Exhibit 8, the bank
statements. Tr. p. 212, ln. 7-13.
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6. Counsel raised the same objections to admission of testimony about
transactions on the ATM card completed in San Francisco. Tr. p. 270, In. 22-24.
7. Counsel raised the same objections to Detective Spain's testimony and
Exhibit 9, copies of bank records, having to do with transactions other than ATM
withdrawals. Tr. p. 385, In. 11-17.
8. Counsel raised the same objections to Exhibit 10, Detective Spain's
summary of the financial records evidence. Tr. p. 403, In. 22-p. 404, ln. 4.
9. Counsel raised the same objections to Exhibit 11, another summary of
financial records evidence by Detective Spain. Tr. p. 411, ln. 2-6.
10. Counsel raised the same objections to Exhibit 12, another summary by
Detective Spain. Tr. p. 418, ln. 3.
The structural due process error with regard to Count I, theft, requires
vacation of that charge. Moreover, Court II, forgery, must also be reversed, because
as evidenced by all these objections the jury heard evidence of all the other means of
theft that the State decided to try to prove at trial, including theft through payroll
record falsification, double payroll checks, checks made out to Ms. Herreman-Garcia
for no identified reason, and ATM purchases of goods and services. This evidence
was not relevant to the charge of forgery, nor to the theft charge based upon ATM
cash withdrawals. IRE 401. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,667,227 P.3d 918,
921 (2010) (appellate court freely reviews the question of relevancy as an issue of
law; evidence that Johnson had molested his sister when he was a teen irrelevant to
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lewd conduct with his daughter.) Further, the State gave no IRE 404(b)
so the evidence was absolutely inadmissible as evidence of other bad acts.

State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230, 178 P.3d 28, 33 (2008) (failure to give IRE
404(b) notice renders other bad acts evidence inadmissible). Moreover, the error in
admitting the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., citing

Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 156, 177 P.3d 362, 371 (2008), requiring that hold
the error harmless, the Court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence omplained of contributed to
the conviction. As in Sheldon, the evidence of the huge number of other supposed
thefts was highly prejudicial, it caught defense counsel off guard, and thus was not
effectively countered and consequently requires reversal of both the theft and the
forgery charges.
2. Exclusion of Evidence Needed to Establish a Defense
In addition to the above evidentiary errors, the District Court improperly
disallowed evidence needed to establish Ms. Herreman-Garcia's defense.
An accused has a constitutional right to present a defense, which is rooted in
the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and includes the right to offer
testimony of witnesses, to compel their attendance, and to present the defense
version of the facts. State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950,955,231 P.3d 1047, 1052
(Ct.App. 2010). See also, Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13.
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In this case, the District Court violated that right. The Court sustained the
State's relevancy objection to questioning of Mr. Antonio Ayon about the IRS audit
of A&A. Tr. p. 218, ln. 10-p. 219, ln. 19. However, this testimony was relevant to
establish that A&A was engaged in hiding income and that the checks diverted to
Ms. Herreman-Garcia may have been part of that hiding. Tr. p. 219, ln. 6-9. Later,
when counsel again tried to obtain Mr. Ayon's testimony about efforts to avoid tax
liability by diverting the Mittal and HOA checks directly into Ms. HerremanGarcia's account, the Court interposed its own apparent relevancy objection and
disallowed the testimony. Tr. p. 255, In. 6-13.
This Court freely reviews relevancy determinations by the District Court.

State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667, 227 P.3d at 921. Obviously, this evidence was
relevant to establishing the defense that A&A had authorized the transfers of
checks to Ms. Herreman-Garcia to avoid tax liability. Further, the State cannot
prove that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Perry, supra.
Had the jury heard this evidence, there is a clear possibility that it would have not
convicted Ms. Herreman-Garcia. With regard to the forgery charges the lack of the
defense evidence was clearly not harmless. See I.C. § 28-3-203 allowing transfer of
a negotiable instrument and provides that it vests in the transferee any right of the
transferor to enforce the instrument. Likewise, since no unanimity instruction was
given as to theft, it may be that the jury convicted Ms. Herreman-Garcia based
upon the Mittal and HOA checks - in which case, the failure to allow testimony of
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defense was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to theft as well as
forgery.
Based on these evidentiary errors, both convictions must be reversed.

IV. CONCLUSION
Both convictions must be vacated for structural error in failing to give
required due process notice of the charge against Ms. Herreman-Garcia. They must
also be reversed because of fundamental error in failing to give unanimity
instructions. And, further, they must be reversed because of objected to evidentiary
errors. Ms. Herreman-Garcia respectfully requests that this Court grant the
required relief.
Submitted thi~s:ty of November, 2015.

~"'-$~~-Dennis Benjamin \
Attorneys for Ana Herreman-Garcia
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